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Abstract
We present an empirical study of the intertwined behaviour of members
in a financial market. Exploiting a database where the broker that initiates
an order book event can be identified, we decompose the correlation and
response functions into contributions coming from different market partic-
ipants and study how their behaviour is interconnected. We find evidence
that (1) brokers are very heterogeneous in liquidity provision – some appear
to be primarily liquidity providers while others are primarily liquidity tak-
ers. (2) The behaviour of brokers is strongly conditioned on the actions of
other brokers. In contrast brokers are only weakly influenced by the impact
of their own previous orders. (3) The total impact of market orders is the
result of a subtle compensation between the same broker pushing the price
in one direction and the liquidity provision of other brokers pushing it in
the opposite direction. These results enforce the picture of market dynam-
ics being the result of the competition between heterogeneous participants,
interacting to form a complex market ecology.
Keywords: Financial markets, market microstructure, limit order book, order
flow, behavioural economics
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies of order flow and market impact have recently boomed due
to the availability of high frequency data, where all market events (trades, limit
orders, cancellations) are recorded. These data sets allow one to investigate many
interesting statistical regularities at the order book level, and shed light on the
price formation mechanisms. One of the most interesting results established in the
recent literature concerns the long-ranged correlated nature of the order flow, and
a detailed understanding of the impact of individual transactions on prices (see [1]
for a recent review, and references therein).
However, most empirical studies to date rely on a purely anonymous order flow:
trades, limit orders and cancellations cannot be traced to a particular agent in the
market. In order to access this data, some special agreement must be reached
with exchanges, which regulators allow or even promote in certain conditions (for
example in order to investigate the role of “high-frequency traders” in the market,
see the interesting recent papers [2, 3]).
The data that we exploit here is unfortunately not as detailed, but allows us
to identify the activity of market members of the LSE (London Stock Exchange)
in the period May, 2000 – December, 2002. Since members are often brokers who
act on the behalf of many final clients, the granularity of the order flow is quite
coarse, still some interesting conclusions can be drawn from this data, as has been
shown in [4, 5, 6]. Note that since most members also act as brokers, we will
throughout use the word “broker” as synonymous with “member” and we will use
these terms interchangeably. Here, we want to adapt a formalism introduced by
some of us in Ref. [7] to investigate the correlation and impact of various types
of order book events. In that paper, events were broken down into six categories:
market orders, limit orders and cancellations, and for each type whether the event
immediately changes the midpoint price or not. In principle, further categories
can be envisaged, and here we add the brokerage code as an additional tag.
Using this decomposition, our goal is to elicit how the interaction between het-
erogeneous actors in the market results in a subtle ecology [19, 14], with measurable
effects in the price dynamics. We first use the type of order (limit orders vs. mar-
ket orders) as conditioning variable to check for heterogeneity among the brokers.
We find that it is possible to distinguish between “liquidity providers” (placing
predominantly limit orders) and “liquidity takers” (placing predominantly market
orders) in the market. We furthermore find that there is a clear difference between
the impact of price-changing limit orders and price-changing market orders, de-
pending on the category of brokers. Next we look at the temporal dynamics of
the different types of orders. Further conditioning on whether a limit order or a
market order changed the mid-price or not, we find that the actions of brokers are
strongly conditioned on the actions of other brokers. Brokers react to the same
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price change in a different way whether the price change is a result of their own
actions, or results from the action of other brokers. Finally we decompose the
total impact of a given type of order book event into a contribution from the very
broker that caused the initial event and a contribution from all other brokers. We
find that these two contributions very nearly offset each other, leading to a total
impact that is nearly constant in time and much smaller than either of these con-
tributions. This is the central result of this paper, which confirms the dynamical
liquidity picture put forth in [8, 9, 10, 11, 1, 7], according to which the highly per-
sistent sign of market orders must be buffered by a fine-tuned counteracting limit
order flow in order to maintain statistical efficiency (i.e. that the price changes are
close to unpredictable, in spite of the long-ranged correlation of the order flow, see
also [23]).We believe that the quantitative result presented here is a very important
ingredient to understand the dynamics of markets, since it explicitly demonstrates
that the stability of markets relies on a rather precise balance between liquidity
taking and liquidity providing, and that small fluctuations of one or the other can
lead to micro-liquidity crises and price jumps [12, 13].
2 Data and notation
In this paper we analyze data on 7 of the most liquid stocks traded at the LSE
during the period May, 2000 – December, 20021. Our data set contains all on-
book events for the stocks. We only consider the usual trading time between
8:00–16:30, all other periods are discarded. The unique feature of our data set is
that each order is characterized by a membership code identifying the initiator of
the order. These codes uniquely represent the member firms of the LSE even if
we are not able to identify the firms by name. (Actually the brokerage codes in
our data are reshuffled at the beginning of each month. However, since most of
the results we show happen at the intraday scale, we can ignore the effect of the
reshuffling.) The activity level of brokerages is very heterogeneous. For example,
in a typical month for AZN the 5 most active market members are responsible
for 40-50% of transactions and the 15 most active ones are responsible for 80-90%
of transactions. Thus the trading activity is strongly concentrated in a relatively
small number of member firms. In Table 1 we show summary statistics of the
stocks and the brokerages. We present the number of events for each stock, the
ratio of the tick size to the average price, the typical (average) number of active
brokers. In a given month we define αi as the fraction of trades initiated by broker
i. The typical Gini coefficient of αi is about 0.8, and the typical standard deviation
of log10 αi is a little more than one, indicating that the typical difference between
1The studied stocks are AstraZeneca (AZN), BHP Billiton (BLT), Lloyds Banking Group
(LLOY), Prudential (PRU), Rentokil Initial (RTO), Tesco (TSCO), Vodafone Group (VOD).
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ticker number tick/avg price typical number Gini std(log10 αi)
of events [×10−4] of brokers coeff.
AZN 1,846,922 3.49 95 0.80 1.12
BLT 958,573 7.69 69 0.75 1.03
LLOY 1,761,548 7.84 104 0.79 1.13
PRU 1,312,220 7.44 88 0.77 1.10
RTO 714,665 11.07 65 0.75 1.02
TSCO 1,175,353 10.68 87 0.78 1.10
VOD 2,712,084 15.23 134 0.82 1.13
Table 1: Summary statistics for the data we study here. The first three columns are the ticker,
the total number of events and the ratio of the tick size to the average price. Letting αi be the
fraction of the trades during a given month initiated by broker i, the other fourth column shows
the typical (average) number of active brokerages (defined to be those with αi > 0.01). The
fourth column is the Gini coefficient of αi, and the sixth is the standard deviation of log10 αi.
the activity of two brokers chosen at random is more than an order of magnitude.
Following Ref. [7] we will analyse time series of order book events. We use
the name “event” for any change in the order book that modifies the bid or ask
price or the volume quoted at these prices. Events will be used as the unit of time.
Since there can be many events between two transactions this notion of “event
time” is similar but more fine-grained than the notion of transaction time used in
many papers. The price just before the tth event is defined as the midpoint price
pt, i.e. the average of the best ask and best bid quote. We use ticks as the units
of price. The type of event at time t will be denoted by pit. The upper index
′
(“prime”) denotes that an event changed the price pt, and the upper index 0 that
it did not. The possible events are:
• MO0 is an effective market order2 that does not change the price.
• MO′ is an effective market order that does change the price.
• LO0 is a limit order at the current bid or ask (which does not change the
price).
• LO′ is a limit order inside the spread (which does change the price).
• CA0 is cancellation at the bid or ask that does not remove all the volume
quoted (and thus does not change the price).
2 By effective market order we mean any event that generates immediate transactions with
existing orders in the limit order book.
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• CA′ is a cancellation at the bid or the ask that does remove all the volume
quoted (and thus does change the price).
Abbreviations without the upper index (MO, CA, LO) refer to events whether
or not they change the price. We will not explicitly consider limit orders and
cancellations inside the order book, because they do not have an immediate effect
on the best quotes. The event at time t is given a sign t according to its expected
long-term effect on the price. For market orders and limit orders this corresponds
to order signs, i.e., t = 1 for buy orders and −1 for sell orders. Cancellation of a
sell limit order has t = 1 while cancellation of a buy limit order has t = −1 (the
sign is reversed because the effect on the price is in the opposite direction).
We will use the indicator function I(A) which is defined as I(A) = 1 if the
condition A is true and I(A) = 0 otherwise. For example, the indicator variable
I(pit = pi) is 1 if the event at time t is of type pi and zero otherwise. The uncon-
ditional probability of the event type pi is by definition P (pi) = 〈I(pit = pi)〉. The
market member acting at time t will be denoted by bt, and the indicator function
I(bt = b) is 1 if the broker acting at time t is b and zero otherwise.
As discussed in Ref. [7], the use of the indicator functions simplifies the formal
calculation of conditional expectations. For example, if a quantity Xpi,t depends
on the event type pi and and the time t, then its conditional expectation at times
of pi-type events is
〈Xpit,t | pit = pi〉 =
〈Xpi,tI(pit = pi)〉
P (pi)
. (1)
The average behaviour of the price ` time steps after an event of a particular
type pi1 defines the corresponding response function (or average impact function)
[14]
Rpi1(`) =
〈(pt+` − pt)I(pit = pi1)t〉
P (pi1)
. (2)
This response can be divided into a part that is the response due to the actions
of the same broker as the one active at time t (Rsamepi1 (`)), and the response due to
other brokers (Rdiffpi1 (`)).
The response due to the same broker can be written
Rsamepi1 (`) =
〈∑t+`−1
t′=t (pt′+1 − pt′)I(bt′ = bt)I(pit = pi1)t
〉
P (pi1)
. (3)
Rsamepi1 (`) is the expected price change between time t and t+` caused by the further
actions of the same broker that acted at time t and ignoring all other brokers (since
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I(bt′ = bt) picks out only events from the same broker). Conversely the response
that is only due to other brokers can be written
Rdiffpi1 (`) =
〈∑t+`−1
t′=t (pt′+1 − pt′)I(bt′ 6= bt)I(pit = pi1)t
〉
P (pi1)
. (4)
Trivially Rsamepi1 (`) + R
diff
pi1
(`) = Rpi1(`). Furthermore, we can define the different
contributions to the response Rsamepi1 (`) coming from the possible pi2 types of events
occurring at t′ as
Rsamepi1,pi2(`) =
〈∑t+`−1
t′=t (pt′+1 − pt′)I(pit′ = pi2)I(bt′ = bt)I(pit = pi1)t
〉
P (pi1)
, (5)
and similarly for Rdiffpi1,pi2(`).
In a similar way one can define the correlation function of order signs3
Cpi1,pi2(`) =
〈I(pit+` = pi2)t+`I(pit = pi1)t〉
P (pi1)P (pi2)
, (6)
which again can be divided as the sum of the correlation between events initiated
by the same broker (Csamepi1,pi2(`)) and the correlation between events initiated by
different brokers (Cdiffpi1,pi2(`)),
Csamepi1,pi2(`) =
〈I(pit+` = pi2)t+`I(pit = pi1)tI(bt+` = bt)〉
P (pi1)P (pi2)
, (7)
Cdiffpi1,pi2(`) =
〈I(pit+` = pi2)t+`I(pit = pi1)tI(bt+` 6= bt)〉
P (pi1)P (pi2)
. (8)
For simplicity, when talking about the response functions and the correlations,
we will simply refer to Rsamepi1 (`) and C
same
pi1,pi2
(`) as the contribution of the same broker,
while we will refer to Rdiffpi1 (`) and C
diff
pi1,pi2
(`) as the contribution of other brokers.
When showing our results, we averaged over all the 7 stocks studied. However,
we checked all the results for each stock individually and found that the results
are very similar.
3Note that the correlation function that we use is the conditional expectation
〈tt+` | pit = pi1, pit+` = pi2〉 and is not normalized between [−1, 1].
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3 Heterogeneity of broker liquidity provision
Are brokers homogeneous in the sense that an event from a given broker has the
same statistical properties as an event from any other broker? Or are brokers
heterogeneous in the sense that their events have different statistical properties?
In this section we show that when it comes to liquidity provision brokers are very
heterogeneous.
As is well known, the definition of liquidity is not unique, but in the present
paper by liquidity we mean the volume in the order book. According to this
definition limit orders provide liquidity and market orders take away liquidity from
the market. Within the classic market microstructure models [29, 24, 26, 25, 3],
such as the Glosten-Milgrom model [28], investors are classified into two categories:
informed traders and market makers (often a third category, noise traders are
added). Informed investors are supposed to possess superior information and use
market orders to exploit their information immediately. Some other participants
specialize in market making activities, who provide liquidity to both the buy and
sell side and attempt to make a profit from the bid-ask spread. In this view,
informed traders are liquidity takers, while liquidity providers are market makers.
However, in modern automated markets (such as the LSE) this distinction is not
obvious since any investor can use market or limit orders to trade and therefore
act alternatively as a liquidity taker or as a provider. Recent empirical research,
such as the one in Ref. [2], has indeed found that different types of investors, such
as fundamental investors and high frequency traders, use a similar mixture of limit
and market orders.
Here we want to investigate whether individual brokers show a heterogeneous
profile of liquidity provision. To this end we measure for each broker the number
of price changing market orders over the total number of price changing orders.
Note that we consider only price changing orders (and not all MO and LO), since
these are orders with an immediate effect on the price. This we do in order to
include less bias in the statistics due to orders being placed and cancelled almost
immediately. More formally, let #MO′b be the number of price changing market
orders placed by broker b in a given month, and similarly #LO′b be the number of
price changing limit orders placed by broker b in that month. The fraction
fMO
′
b =
#MO′b
#MO′b + #LO
′
b
(9)
is the fraction of price changing market orders placed by broker b in a given month
(we use a month because the brokerage codes are shuffled every month). A high
value of fMO
′
b thus implies that a broker tends to be a liquidity taker and a low
value of fMO
′
b implies that she tends to be a liquidity provider. The distribution
4 of
4 Note that the distribution is not weighted by the size of the broker.
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the average values of fMO
′
b is shown in the left panel of Fig. (1). This distribution
is extremely broad, with average values of fMO
′
b ranging from f
MO′
b ≈ 0, indicating
a broker that acts as a liquidity provider, using limit orders almost exclusively, to
fMO
′
b ≈ 0.8, indicating a broker that acts as a liquidity taker, predominantly using
market orders.
Statistical testing shows that the wide variation in fMO
′
b is due to real het-
erogeneity among the brokers rather than statistical fluctuations. If we define a
series with values of one or zero depending on whether a price changing order is
an effective market order or a limit order, the characteristic time for the autocor-
relation to decay into the noise level is less than ten price changing orders. This
enables us to estimate the standard deviation of the fMO
′
b value for each broker by
drawing block bootstrap samples for all brokers in all periods (with block sizes of
10 orders). The typical standard deviation for the fMO
′
b values is less than 0.04.
Thus the broad distribution of values of fMO
′
b shown in Fig. (1) is almost entirely
real variation, corresponding to heterogeneous behaviour across brokers. We find
that fMO
′
b does not show significant dependence on the size of the broker (defined
by his total number of orders of any type), so there is no simple relation between
transaction volumes and the use of market vs. limit orders that would reflect,
for example, some systematic difference of information between large and small
brokers.
Nonetheless, the results summarized in the right panel of Fig. (1) suggest that
brokers with different levels of liquidity provision specialize in different types of
execution. We show the average immediate impact Rpi(` = 1) of an order of type
pi = LO′ and pi = MO′ as a function of fMO
′
b . To reduce the statistical variation we
bin the brokers into five groups according to fMO
′
b , and plot the average value of
Rpi(` = 1) in each bin against the average value of f
MO′
b for that bin. The impact
for market orders decreases slightly with fMO
′
b , indicating that brokers who use
market orders more frequently get better execution. For limit orders, in contrast,
the lowest impact is for low values of fMO
′
b , indicating that brokers who use limit
orders more frequently get better execution. For the top two quintiles of fMO
′
b
there is essentially no difference between the impact of limit orders and market
orders, while for the lowest quintile the difference is dramatic – limit orders have
an impact of about a tick, while market orders have more than 1.4 ticks of impact.
This difference is statistically robust. Details of the statistical tests can be found
in Appendix A.
These observations are compatible with the standard classification made in
the microstructure literature and reviewed above. In particular, brokers who are
predominantly providing liquidity tend to transact passively with less information
so that their limit orders have less impact than those of directional traders. Still,
in the rare cases where these liquidity providers use market orders, e.g. to flatten
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their positions at the end of the day, they tend to execute under unfavourable
circumstances, e.g. under more time pressure to execute a large quantity, and
therefore have a larger impact.
This interpretation suggests that the correlation of the order flow should be
quite different for brokers with low values of fMO
′
b and for brokers with large values
of fMO
′
b . If the former category really acted primarily as market makers, their order
flow should be significantly negatively correlated in time, whereas liquidity takers
would contribute to the overall positive correlation of the order flow reported
below. However, we did not find any significant difference between the groups.
Because of this we cannot conclude that brokers predominantly providing liquidity
act as traditional market makers. This might be partly due to the fact that even
directional traders make extensive use of limit orders (as it was pointed out in,
e.g. [1]).
Our only firm conclusion is therefore that there is a significant heterogeneity
among brokers in the way they are using market orders versus limit orders when
executing a large metaorder. The right panel of Fig. (1) suggest that brokers who
use a given type of order more often are more skillful at using this type of order,
in the sense that they impact less the price by doing so. (We assume here that
a smaller impact means a better execution price, which might not always be the
case).
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Figure 1: (left) The distribution of the ratio fMO
′
b , defined in Eq. (9), which takes on low values
for brokers who tend to be liquidity providers and higher values for brokers that tend to be
liquidity takers. We only include brokers whose number of trades is at least 1% of the total in a
given month. (right) The immediate impact Rpi(` = 1) for price changing limit orders pi = LO
′
and pi = MO′ orders is plotted as a function of fMO
′
b , the fraction of price changing market
orders. To reduce statistical fluctuations the data are binned into five groups according to fMO
′
b .
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4 Regularities in order placement
The above analysis can also be used to gain insight into the origin of long-ranged
correlation in the sign of orders. Using the above formalism, we can break up this
correlation into different contributions, depending on whether or not the event is
price changing and whether the broker is the same or different. As we will see, the
response of brokers to their own price changes is quite different than their response
to the price changes of others.
In the left panel of Fig. (2) we plot some relevant correlations for market orders,
in particular CMO0,MO0(`) and CMO′,MO0(`), conditioning on the same broker and
on different brokers. It can be seen that:
• i) The autocorrelations Csame
MO0,MO0
(`), Csame
MO′,MO0(`), and C
diff
MO0,MO0
(`) all be-
have similarly. They are positive for lags up to more than 500, and they all
decay roughly as power laws, `−γ with γ ≈ 0.5. This is very close to the ex-
ponent found in [8, 14] for the unconditional autocorrelation of market order
sign. The three autocorrelations differ in amplitude: Csame
MO0,MO0
(`) is largest,
with a value of roughly 0.8 for lag one, then Cdiff
MO0,MO0
(`), with a value of
roughly 0.2 for lag one, and finally Csame
MO′,MO0(`), with a value less than 0.1
at lag one. They all decay roughly in the same way across the entire range
(see also [16]).
• ii) In contrast, the autocorrelation Cdiff
MO′,MO0(`), which measures the response
of another broker to a price changing market order, is weakly but consistently
negative and shows no clear pattern of decay. Furthermore its behaviour is
completely different to that of Cdiff
MO0,MO0
(`).
Stated in different terms, the first set of results imply that the response to a
non-price-changing market order is always the same: Whether subsequent orders
come from the same broker or a different broker, subsequent order placements
tend to be of the same sign. This is in contrast to the response to a price-changing
market order. In this case the same broker tends to keep placing orders of the same
sign as her original order, while other brokers tend to place orders of opposite signs
to the original order.
To asses the statistical significance of the correlations we constructed the fol-
lowing test. We randomly reshuffled the time series of order signs, t, and measured
the correlation of the reshuffled series. Since by reshuffling we purposefully destroy
all correlations, we can expect that the correlation level of the reshuffled time series
is the noise level of our correlation measure. Carrying out 1000 such reshuffling
experiments and measuring the correlation function in each case, for the absolute
value of the autocorrelation we get an average of C˜ ≈ 5 · 10−4, that is 2− 3 orders
of magnitude lower than the measured correlation values. The 99% quantile of
10
xEG
Y[
log
_t]
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l l l l l0.01
0.1
1
l
CMO0 MO0
same
 (l)
CMO′ MO0
same
 (l)
1 5 10 50 100 500 1000
x
−
N
EG
Y[
log
_t]
−1
−0.1
−0.01
l [events]
CMO0 MO0
diff
 (l)
CMO′ MO0
diff
 (l)
x
EG
Y[
log
_t]
l
l
l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
l l l0.01
0.1
1
l
CLO0 LO′
same
 (l)
CLO′ LO′
same
 (l)
1 5 10 50 100 500 1000
x
−
N
EG
Y[
log
_t]
−1
−0.1
−0.01
l [events]
CLO0 LO′
diff
 (l)
CLO′ LO′
diff
 (l)
Figure 2: Correlation functions between events. (left) The correlation CMO0,MO0(`) between non-
price-changing market orders at two different times, and the correlation CMO′,MO0(`) between
a price-changing market order and a non-price-changing market order. In each case we present
results conditioned on the same broker for the two events vs. a different broker for the two
events. (right) The correlation CLO0,LO′(`) for a non-price changing and a price changing limit
order, and the correlation CLO′,LO′(`) for two price changing limit orders.
the absolute value of the autocorrelations is ≈ 2 · 10−3. This tells us that all the
correlation curves in Fig. (2) are indeed significant.
The observation of long-memory autocorrelation functions for orders placed
by the same broker provides additional evidence that at the brokerage level the
long-memory of order flow is primarily driven by the splitting of large metaorders
into small pieces, as posited in [17, 1] (see also [11, 16] for additional empirical
evidence supporting this hypothesis). The theoretical motivations for order split-
ting were first discussed by Kyle [21] (note however that Kyle’s model does not
generate correlation in the sign of the trades!). Ref. [22] discusses an optimal
execution strategy of block trades, and conclude that order splitting is indeed op-
timal. Recently some of us [23] proposed a dynamical theory of market liquidity
that predicts a vanishingly small volume around the current price resulting in a
need to split large orders.
The autocorrelation of orders placed by the same broker decays slowly whether
or not the original market order causes a price change. Given that a price change
in the same direction is unfavourable (a buyer does not want the price to rise), this
is a bit surprising at first sight. However, note that although there is long-memory
in both cases, the magnitude of the correlation is roughly a factor of eight smaller
for orders issued by the same broker.
The fact that order flow by the same broker continues in the same direction
suggests that parent orders (or ‘metaorders’) are executed to a large extent inde-
pendently of the price change, even when this change is caused by trading. From
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a behavioural finance perspective, agents doing splitting appear to act like “noise
traders”, i.e. they adapt their own order flow very little to the effect of their own
recent trading. This is the essence of the model proposed in [17]. This, we believe,
is either because agents neglect impact altogether (it is after all a small effect
compared to the volatility of prices), or because they have already factored in the
impact of their trades in their estimates of trading costs and thus are rationally
following their plan to let their order run until executed.
The fact that the autocorrelation in response to a non-price-changing market
order is also positive, even for different brokers, suggests herding behaviour. This
could happen in two ways: a) one is that after a non-aggressive market order MO0,
other brokers jump on the bandwagon, thinking there might be some information
in the initial trade, or alternatively, b) the other brokers might be responding to
the same information signals as the original broker, but with a slight lag.
Surprisingly, though, if the original market order is price-changing, the sign of
this effect is reversed. In this case the original market order triggers the activity
of “other brokers” with the opposite sign. The observation of a price rise converts
the other brokers (or at least a majority of them) from buyers to sellers, or from
sellers to buyers. This is compatible with the idea of a large liquidity buffer that
reveals itself as soon as the price changes (see [9, 23]), which seems to be enough
to overwhelm the herding effect that is seen when there is no price change.
Similar behaviour is seen for limit orders as well when the broker is the same,
but the situation is somewhat altered when the broker is different. The right
panel of Fig. 2 shows CLO0,LO′(`) and CLO′,LO′(`). Again, we find that C
same
LO0,LO′(`)
is similar to CsameLO′,LO′(`). In this case, however, there is no herding on the part of
other brokers since both Cdiff
LO0,LO′(`), C
diff
LO′,LO′(`) are negative (except at very short
lags ` < 5 for Cdiff
LO0,LO′(`)). Thus at long time lags other brokers respond to limit
orders by placing orders of the opposite sign, whether or not the original order
was price-changing.
Even restricting to LO’s and MO’s and discarding CA’s, one can define a total
of 32 different correlation functions, whereas Fig. 2 only shows 8 of these. Each of
these correlation functions answers a different question: conditioned to an event
of type pi1 issued by a broker b, what is the excess probability that a broker b
′
(with b′ = b or b′ 6= b) issues an event of type pi2 with the same sign after `
trades? For lack of space, and because not all these correlations tell interesting
stories, we choose to restrict here to three additional ones, shown in Fig. 3.5 The
question they answer is the following: conditioned on a non-price-changing order
by broker b, what is the excess probability that the same broker b issues a price-
changing order with the same sign after ` trades, when the original order is either
5All the correlation functions are available in the Appendix of the arXiv version of this paper,
see http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.0587.
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a market order MO0 or a limit order LO0. The four excess probabilities are given
by P (pi2)C
same
pi1,pi2
(`) with pi1 = MO
0 or LO0 and pi2 = MO
′ or LO′, as shown in Fig.
3. (Note that CsameLO′,LO′(`) already appears in Fig. 2, right, so that we indeed only
add three new quantities to the above.)
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Figure 3: The probability for a given broker to place price changing limit orders or market
orders conditioned on starting with non-price-changing orders. In each case we show the excess
probability P (pi2)C
same
pi1,pi2(`) that the same broker b issues a price-changing order with the same
sign after ` trades, with pi2 = LO
′ or MO′. The left panel shows pi1 = MO0 and the right panel
pi1 = LO
0.
What transpires from these plots is that conditioned on the fact that a broker
decided to execute using a non-aggressive market order MO0, she will make roughly
equal use of MO′ and LO′ in the future, whereas after deciding to place a non-
aggressive limit order LO0, the probability to continue using limit orders in the
future is much larger than switching to market orders. This result, however, mostly
comes from the contribution of the brokers with the smallest fMO
′
b , i.e. those
brokers who mostly use stealth limit orders, for which such a strategy is indeed
expected.
5 Balance between liquidity taking and liquidity
providing
Let us investigate another aspect of the intertwined liquidity dynamics, and present
the most striking result of our study. It is known from previous results [18, 14, 7]
that the average impact of market orders, RMO(`), first increases rapidly with `
and then becomes flat for large `. To understand the reason for the flattening of
the response function, we studied the contributions coming from the actions of the
same broker and of other brokers. When disaggregating these two effects, we find
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that the flat response function comes from a nearly exact cancellation between
RsameMO (`), which increases as roughly
√
`, and RdiffMO(`), which decreases as roughly√
`. The growth of RsameMO (`) can be directly understood from the self-correlation
Csame(`) described above6. The impact functions illustrating this behaviour for
event types MO0 and MO′ can be seen in Figure 4. To better show the power
law increase of the absolute values, in Figure 5 we plot RsameMO (`) on a log-log scale,
together with −RdiffMO(`) + const., where a constant term was just added in order
to better visualise the similarity of the curves.
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Figure 4: The response function Rpi1(`) and its contributions coming from the orders of the same
broker (Rsamepi1 (`)) and of different brokers (R
diff
pi1 (`)). (left) The case of pi1 = MO
0. (right) The
case of pi1 = MO
′. The insets show a zoom for small `.
Interestingly, the sum of these two responses give a total response that is much
weaker in absolute value and is flat for time lags ` ' 100. This is the central result
of our study. The short time behaviour (` / 10−20) is different when (i) the initial
order left the price unchanged (MO0) and (ii) when it changed the price (MO′).
In case (i) the contribution coming from different brokers is initially positive and
then becomes negative, while in case (ii) it is immediately negative. Therefore,
upon an aggressive buy market order (MO′) from one broker, the other brokers
(probably those with small fMO
′
b ’s) react by immediately providing liquidity to the
market, and continue to do so during the whole ‘buying spree’, thereby limiting
the total upward price shift. After a non-aggressive market order, on the other
hand, the herding mechanism described in the previous section explains the initial
positive contribution of Rdiff
MO0
(`) seen in Figure 4, left (inset).
6More precisely, for large tick stocks the response is related to the integral of the correlation
functions [7]. Therefore, since the correlations CsameMO,pi2(t
′) all have a power law decay with
exponents close to γ = 0.5, we expect the response to increase with an exponent close to 1−γ =
0.5. In fact Rsame
MO0
(`) increases as a power law with an exponent between 0.5 and 0.63 for all the
studied stocks, while RsameMO′ (`) show slightly lower exponents between 0.38 and 0.51.
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The above findings extend to the decomposition of all types of impact functions
Rpi(`). After any type of event, the response due to the same broker’s actions is
monotonically increasing. In contrast, the response due to the rest of the market
is always monotonically decreasing for ` ' 10− 20 7.
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Figure 5: The contributions to the response function Rpi1(`) form the same broker and from
different brokers on a log-log scale. We show RsameMO (`), together with −RdiffMO(`) + const., where a
constant term was just added in order to better visualise the similarity of the curves. (left) The
case of pi1 = MO
0. (right) The case of pi1 = MO
′.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to use the formalism introduced in [7] to exploit a
database where the broker initiating an order book event can be identified, and
decompose the correlations and response functions into different contributions.
This allowed us to identify several interesting regularities in order placement, as
summarized below:
• In Section 3 we present clear evidence that brokers are heterogeneous in
their liquidity provision. Different brokers use different type of strategies,
from liquidity providing strategies with a small fraction of market orders to
liquidity taking strategies with a very large fraction of market orders.
• In Section 4 we confirm that the long-range correlation in the sign of market
orders comes mostly from order splitting from a unique broker. There is,
however, a certain degree of herding behaviour from other brokers which is
7The frequency of events varies among stocks and changes in time. On average the frequency
of events in the period studied was 0.28 events/sec.
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evident as long as the price does not change. After a price changing market
order, however, the broker responsible for it continues trading in the same
direction regardless of his own impact, whereas other brokers start firing
market orders in the opposite direction.
• The central finding of our study is that the total impact of market orders
results from the nearly perfect compensation between two opposite contri-
butions: one resulting from the accumulation of orders in the same direction
coming from the same broker, while the reaction of brokers who provide liq-
uidity results in an impact of roughly equal magnitude but opposite sign.
(The contribution by other brokers is always a bit smaller, so that the total
impact has the correct sign).
These results suggest a picture of the ecology of markets anticipated in several
papers (see e.g. [19, 20, 9, 4, 5]), where agents are both broadly heterogeneous in
their expectations and strategies, and strongly interacting, with a complex inter-
twined dynamics between liquidity providers and liquidity takers. It is tempting
to conjecture that these ingredients are crucial to understand the incipient insta-
bilities of financial markets, epitomized by price jumps and volatility clustering
[12, 13, 2].
Acknowledgements
FL acknowledges partial support from the grant SNS11LILLB “Price formation,
agents heterogeneity, and market efficiency”.
References
[1] J.-P. Bouchaud, J. D. Farmer, F. Lillo, How markets slowly digest changes
in supply and demand, in: Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and
Evolution, North-Holland, Elsevier, 2009.
[2] A. A. Kirilenko, A. S. Kyle, M. Samadi, T. Tuzun, The Flash Crash: The
Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market, Working Paper,
(2010) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1686004
[3] A. J. Menkveld High-Frequency Trading and The New-Market Makers (EFA
2011/ AFA 2012 paper), (2011)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1722924
16
[4] F. Lillo, E. Moro, G. Vaglica, R. N. Mantegna, Specialization and herding
behavior of trading firms in a financial market, New Journal of Physics 10,
043019 (2008)
[5] E. Moro, J. Vicente, L. G. Moyano, A. Gerig, J. D. Farmer, G. Vaglica, F.
Lillo, R. N. Mantegna, Market impact and trading profile of hidden orders in
stock markets, Physical Review E 80, 066102 (2009)
[6] B. To´th, F. Lillo, J. D. Farmer, Segmentation algorithm for non-stationary
compound Poisson processes, Eur. Phys. J. B 78, 235-243 (2010)
[7] Z. Eisler, J.-P. Bouchaud, J. Kockelkoren, The price impact of order book
events: market orders, limit orders and cancellations, Quantitative Finance,
DOI:10.1080/14697688.2010.528444 (2011)
[8] F. Lillo, J. D. Farmer, The long memory of the efficient market, Studies in
Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, 8, 1 (2004).
[9] J.-P. Bouchaud, J. Kockelkoren, M. Potters, Random walks, liquidity mo-
lasses and critical response in financial markets, Quantitative Finance, 6, 115
(2006).
[10] J. D. Farmer, A. Gerig, F. Lillo, and S. Mike. Market Efficiency and the Long-
Memory of Supply and Demand: Is Price Impact Variable and Permanent or
Fixed and Temporary. Quantitative Finance. 6 (2), 107 (2006).
[11] A. Gerig, Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, (2007)
[12] A. Joulin, A. Lefevre, D. Grunberg, J.-P. Bouchaud, Stock price jumps: news
and volume play a minor role, Wilmott Mag., Sept/Oct 2008
[13] J.-P. Bouchaud, The Endogenous Dynamics of Markets: Price Impact, Feed-
back Loops and Instabilities, in ‘Lessons from the Credit Crisis’, A. Berd Edt.,
Risk Publications (2011).
[14] J.-P. Bouchaud, Y. Gefen, M. Potters, M. Wyart, Fluctuations and response
in financial markets: The subtle nature of random price changes, Quantitative
Finance, 4, 176, (2004)
[15] B. Efron, Bootstrap methods: Another look at the Jackknife, The Annals of
Statistics, Vol. 7., No. 1., 1, (1979)
[16] B. To´th, I. Palit, F. Lillo, J. D. Farmer, Why is order flow so persistent?,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.1632 (2011)
17
[17] F. Lillo, S. Mike, J. D. Farmer, Theory for long memory in supply and demand,
Physical Review E 71, 066122 (2005)
[18] J. Hasbrouck, Measuring the information content of stock trades, Journal of
Finance, XLVI, 179, (1991)
[19] P. Handa, R. A. Schwartz, A. Tiwari, The Ecology of an Order-Driven Market,
Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter, pp. 47-56. (1998)
[20] J. D. Farmer, Market Force, Ecology and Evolution. Industrial and Corporate
Change 11 (5) 895-953 (2002).
[21] A.S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, Econometrica, Vol. 53,
No. 6., 1315-1335 (1985)
[22] A. Obizhaeva, J. Wang, Optimal Trad-
ing Strategy and Supply/Demand Dynamics,
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/obizhaeva/OW060408.pdf
[23] B. To´th, Y. Lempe´rie`re, C. Deremble, J. de Lataillade, J. Kockelkoren, J.-
P. Bouchaud, Anomalous price impact and the critical nature of liquidity in
financial markets, Physical Review X 1, 021006 (2011)
[24] P. Handa, R. A. Schwartz, Limit order trading, Journal of Finance, 51,
183561, (1996)
[25] J. Hasbrouck, Empirical Market Microstructure, Oxford University Press,
2007.
[26] A. Madhavan, Market microstructure: a survey. J. Finance Markets, 2000, 3,
205.
[27] T. Hendershott, A.J. Menkveld, Price Pressures (WFA 2010 paper)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1411943,
(2011)
[28] L. R. Glosten, P. R. Milgrom, Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a special-
ist market with heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 14, 71-100, (1985)
[29] Y. Amihud, H. Mendelson, Market-making with inventory, Journal of financial
Economics, 8, 31-53, (1980)
18
A Significance test for the impact of different
groups of brokers
We used Student’s t-test on the ensemble of the immediate price impacts both to
value the hypothesis that the impact of MO′s and LO′s are different (blue and
green curves in Fig. (1) right panel) and to test if the slope of the curves are
different from zero. The hypothesis that the immediate impacts in Fig (1) come
from distributions with equal means can be rejected at the 5% level for 41 pairs out
of the possible 45 pairs (see Table). This tells us that large part of the differences
between the points are significant.
Q1-LO′ Q2-LO′ Q3-LO′ Q4-LO′ Q5-LO′ Q1-MO′ Q2-MO′ Q3-MO′ Q4-MO′ Q5-MO′
Q1-LO′ 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Q2-LO′ 0.00* 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Q3-LO′ 0.00* 0.00* 1 0.99 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.01**
Q4-LO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.99 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.08 0.05
Q5-LO′ 0.00* 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Q1-MO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.04** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Q2-MO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.04** 1 0.03** 0.00* 0.00*
Q3-MO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.03** 1 0.00* 0.00*
Q4-MO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.08 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 1 0.00*
Q5-MO′ 0.00* 0.00* 0.01** 0.05 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 1
Table 2: The p-values of the hypothesis test that the points presented in Fig. (1) come from
distributions with equal means. Out of the 45 possible point pairs (the matrix is symmetric) in
41 cases the hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level and in 37 cases the hypothesis
can be rejected at the 1% significance level. (* denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes
significance at the 5% level.) Q1,. . . ,Q5 denote the 5 quantiles in Fig (1) with increasing fMO
′
b .
B Plots of all the correlation functions
In this appendix we show all the 72 possible correlation functions mentioned in
Section 4.
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Figure 6: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,MO(`). (left) pi1 = MO
0; (right) pi1 = MO
′
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Figure 7: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,LO(`). (left) pi1 = MO
0; (right) pi1 = MO
′
x
EG
Y[
log
_t]
0.01
0.1
1
l
CMO0 CA0
same
 (l)
CMO0 CA′
same
 (l)
1 5 10 50 100 500 1000
x
−
N
EG
Y[
log
_t]
l
l l l l l l
l l l
l l l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
−1
−0.1
−0.01
l [events]
CMO0 CA0
diff
 (l)
CMO0 CA′
diff
 (l)
x
EG
Y[
log
_t]
l
0.01
0.1
1
l
CMO′ CA0
same
 (l)
CMO′ CA′
same
 (l)
1 5 10 50 100 500 1000
x
−
N
EG
Y[
log
_t]
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l l l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
−1
−0.1
−0.01
l [events]
CMO′ CA0
diff
 (l)
CMO′ CA′
diff
 (l)
Figure 8: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,CA(`). (left) pi1 = MO
0; (right) pi1 = MO
′
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Figure 9: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,MO(`). (left) pi1 = LO
0; (right) pi1 = LO
′
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Figure 10: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,LO(`). (left) pi1 = LO
0; (right) pi1 = LO
′
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Figure 11: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,CA(`). (left) pi1 = LO
0; (right) pi1 = LO
′
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Figure 12: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,MO(`). (left) pi1 = CA
0; (right) pi1 = CA
′
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Figure 13: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,LO(`). (left) pi1 = CA
0; (right) pi1 = CA
′
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Figure 14: Plots of the correlation Cpi1,CA(`). (left) pi1 = CA
0; (right) pi1 = CA
′
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